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Abstract
This paper investigates how mass media provide information to
readers or viewers who have diverse interests. The problem of a mass
medium comes from the fact that there is a constraint on how much
information can be delivered.
It is shown that the mass medium optimally provides information
that is somewhat useful to all agents, but not perfect to anybody in
particular.
This benchmark model is then used to investigate competition
among mass media with di⁄erentiated products. In the equilibrium
of the example studied, mass media di⁄erentiate their news fully, as
if they were monopolies on the subset of readers to which they tailor
their news. However, prices are disciplined by competition.
Keywords: Mass media, product di⁄erentiation, news, cheap talk,
quantization
JEL Classi￿cation: D83, L11, L82
￿Draft. Parts of this paper have been circulated under the title "Mass media: con-
strained information and heterogeneous public".
yUniversity of Southampton, M.Kwiek@soton.ac.uk
11 Introduction
Why do mass media di⁄er from each other and why do they systematically
distort their depiction of reality? The simplest analysis implies that di⁄er-
ences among newspapers should not exist: if readers want to learn the truth
and newspapers want to maximize their myopic revenue from the readers,
then the newspapers should all be alike, printing "the truth" and then com-
peting in prices. There should not be liberal and conservative media outlets
such as the New York Times on one hand and Fox News on the other.
The economic literature tries to confront this puzzle in two di⁄erent ways.
It is sometimes hypothesized that mass media are biased￿ that they do not
maximize the surplus of the readers, but have other agendas. These could
be for instance journalists￿bias, owners￿bias, or more complicated internal
constraints or incentives. Alternatively, these may be the readers who are
biased and prefer to read news con￿rming that bias, instead of learing the
truth.
While this paper does not negate these explanations, it provides a sim-
ple and plausible alternative model in which multiple mass media take very
di⁄erent positions from each other. Both sides of the market￿ the readers
and the mass media￿ are fully rational in a conventional sense and very little
friction is assumed.
The focus is on the de￿ning feature of a mass medium ￿that it provides
information to broad masses. The two basic premises are that readers are
impatient in accessing news and that they are heterogeneous in what type
of news they want to learn. Impatience implies that a message of a mass
medium must be short. Heterogeneity means that a short message cannot
inform everyone perfectly. This creates a trade-o⁄: should a mass medium
focus on a few readers and provide a high quality of signal to them (and
cease to be a mass medium) or present a shallow message, informative to all
but only somewhat?
As the ￿rst step, this trade-o⁄ is investigated in the context of a mo-
2nopolistic mass medium. If the marginal cost of informing symmetrically
heterogeneous readers is low enough, the mass medium optimally chooses to
inform all the readers super￿cially, rather than to focus on one or a few of
them. By extending the readership, the newspaper provides a signal that is
less informative to the inframarginal readers. On one hand the newspaper
sells to more readers, but on the other hand it extracts a lower price from
an individual reader. This is a classical trade-o⁄ of the monopolist￿ and
here the result is unambiguous￿ it is better to increase quantity of readers
rather than the quality of a signal and price to an individual reader. In other
words, the optimal information policy implies elastic demand. The surpris-
ing element is that the correlation of readers￿situations does not have to be
large enough; even if readers are completely statistically independent, the
newspaper chooses to inform them all in an imperfect way.
The second context is a duopoly, where two mass media compete with
each other in choosing information policies and prices, somewhat in spirit
of Hotelling model of product di⁄erentiation. There is a multiplicity of
equilibria, but in all of them newspapers behave as monopolies in choosing
their informational policies for their readerships. The e⁄ect of competition
is twofold. Firstly, prices are lower relative to monopoly. Secondly, the read-
ership sizes cannot be too asymmetric. This is because otherwise, the more
specialized newspaper would be able to capture some of the readers of the
more popular and low quality newspaper and still extract a high enough
price.
This study contributes to a discussion of whether and why mass media
are biased. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) assume that individual readers
derive utility from reading the news con￿rming their initial bias. Bias is a
taste parameter and heterogeneity comes form the fact that di⁄erent readers
are biased di⁄erently. This transforms the model back into a Hotelling model
of di⁄erentiated products. A monopolist would like to position its policy
"in the middle" of the bias spectrum, while ￿rms in duopoly would position
3themselves at the extremes. The authors conclude that competition, contrary
to many opinions, may as well lead to greater bias in the news, measured as
a distance between the real state of nature and the reported news.
Here the consumers are fully rational news readers. Each has her own
guessing problem and purchases a newspaper expecting that it delivers a use-
ful signal. Heterogeneity comes form the assumption that di⁄erent readers
are interested in di⁄erent and possibly correlated guessing problems. For in-
stance, one reader may be interested in the weather in Chicago, another in the
weather in Boston, another in Cleveland and so on. Super￿cially, the results
look similar to Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005): monopolistic newspaper
delivers one weather report to all, even very di⁄erent locations (Chicago,
Boston, Cleveland and all other cities), while ￿rms in duopoly tailor their
news to their segments and deliver news that are specialized to their markets
(maybe weather for Midwest and the East Coast). However, a duopolistic
￿rm provides a signal that is objectively better to an individual reader than
a single-newspaper monopolist does. This cannot be interpreted as biasing
news, which is very di⁄erent to the interpretation given by Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005).
This study adopts a position that media bias is not the right measure
of social desirability of market outcomes.1 Instead, this study employs the
1One cannot say a priori that some readers receiving favourable news about Democratic
party, and others receiving favorable news about Republican party is a worse outcome than
the one in which all readers receive balanced news about both parties. This is for the same
reason as there is no point of forcing football fans and motosport fans to read a bit about
football and a bit about motosport. If people prefer to read slanted news then slanted
news increase social welfare. It is true that the worry about biased news may be justi￿ed
in real world. But this is because of the externalities that news may have through actions
of readers. Reading favorable news about Democratic party a⁄ects only private welfare,
but if political action of the readers is a⁄ected by such news, then the newspapers slanting
the message may create externality, and that is a concern. Since such an externality may
be negative or positive, one cannot say if slanting the news is bad or good. Consider a
newspaper providing slanted news about the environment or education. If that message
leads the readers to pollute less or increase the general level of human capital, then the
central planner should increase such bias. Since this study assumes that there are no
externalities, the results should be interpreted carefully when applying to situations with
4usual e¢ ciency criterion.
Thanks to the simplicity of the model, both positive results and welfare
analysis are clear-cut. Since all readers buy at most one newspaper and since
the entire market will be covered, monopolist￿ s price is not a⁄ecting the total
welfare. This means that the monopolist￿ s problem of constructing revenue-
maximizing information policy is the same as central planer￿ s problem of
constructing welfare-maximizing information policy. Consequently, monop-
olist￿ s outcome is e¢ cient. Two competing newspapers thus cannot provide
better information than a monopolist which owns two newspapers. However,
symmetric duopoly equilibrium will be able to match the e¢ cient outcome.
In addition to this, in any equilibrium duopoly results in a greater consumer
surplus. On the other hand, increasing the number of newspapers from one
to two is unambiguously good: a duopoly in the least e¢ cient equilibrium is
more e¢ cient than a single-newspaper monopoly.
Remaining literature
Apart from already mentioned Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), there is
a number of recent articles analyzing media markets. For instance, Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006) study information bias caused by newspapers￿concern
about their reputation. Namely, newspapers may withhold information that
is true but sounds implausible given readers￿initial prior belief. Barron
(2006) investigates media bias induced by journalists￿career concern. These
papers report other studies as well.
Quantization is the process of converting an input from a rich state space
into a ￿nite number of discrete values. The properties of various quantization
methods are studied in information theory for purpose of coding, compressing
or digitalization (see Gray and Neuho⁄ (1998), or Gersho and Gray (1991)).
This literature is very closely related to the model in this paper, where the
mass medium tries to represent a complex state of nature in a shorter form.
Of a particular importance here is vector quantization, where state space is
externalities, such as media bias in politics.
5multi-dimensional; in this paper dimensions will represent di⁄erent aspects
of reality that are important to di⁄erent agents. Information theory is mostly
interested in asymptotic cases where transmission consists of "large" number
of messages/codewords. This paper however opts for a (mostly) symmetric
model with two messages and two states for each agent, in order to keep as
many formulae explicit as possible.
Daw (1991) investigates a decision maker with bounded memory, who
has to decide whether to remember a lot about the result of one experiment
or rather to remember something about both. In contrast to this study,
Daw￿ s results are that the strategy focusing on one item is better. Apart
from Daw there are very few papers in economics considering a constraint
on information transmission. For instance, a number of studies emerged on
persuasion, started by a few papers by Glazer and Rubinstein (for instance
2004). The key assumption in this literature is that there is a limit on
how many pieces of evidence can be revealed ￿which ones are revealed is
endogenous. This strand di⁄ers from the present study to the extent that
here mass media are assumed to be unbiased. A similar feature is shared
by a number of studies of "advice", where a complex state of the world is
transformed in to a simple recommendation. For a recent study, see Gill
and Sgroi (2008) and a literature overview there. Veldkamp (2006) analyzes
￿nancial frenzies induced by media and the importance of a trade-o⁄between
learning about one market or another. "The trade-o⁄ takes the form of a
constraint on number of signals each reader can purchase. Such a constraint
could be interpreted as limited space in newspapers or limited time to read
each piece of information" (Veldkamp (2006) page 585).
Irmen and Thisse (1998) considers a general Hotelling model, not speci￿c
to mass media, where product characteristics are multidimensional. In their
equilibrium the producers want to di⁄erentiate their products in only one
dimension, but the product characteristics converge in all other dimensions.
The model presented here is di⁄erent and it brings a very di⁄erent conclu-
6sion; the newspapers want to di⁄erentiate along all dimensions. Interestingly,
Irmen and Thisse (1998) use the competition between Newsweek and Time
as their real-life example.
2 Model: monopolistic newspaper
The set of all potential uniformed readers is N = f1;:::;Ng.2 A reader
(receiver, TV viewer, agent, consumer, internet surfer) of type n = 1;:::;N
cares only about dimension n of state s 2 S: Thus a dimension n can be also
called an issue or aspect of reality, that is relevant to reader n:
The state space is S = f0;1g
N, where N is the number of potentially
relevant aspects of reality, and each aspect of reality may be either low,
represented by zero, or high, represented by one. Index m = 1;:::;2N enu-
merates all vectors in S, so that m￿ th possible realization of the state is
sm = (sm
1 ;:::;sm
N) 2 S (This index will be ignored where possible). Vectors
consisting of N ones or zeros will be denoted 1N or 0N respectively. The
probability of s is given by q (s). Let Qn (sn) =
P
fm:sm
n =sng q (sm) be the
marginal distribution of nth dimension.
One property will be assumed about the distribution function for the
entire presentation.
Assumption 1 For any n, marginal distribution is uniform, that is
1
2
= Qn (0) = Qn (1)
This assumption merely says that in the absence of any additional infor-
mation such as provided by the newspaper, a reader is uncertain about her
state. If this marginal distribution is strongly skewed in one direction, then
the newspaper is unlikely to change the view of the reader and hence has
little value to her.
2Notation: the set N will have N elements, the set N0 will have N0 elements etc.
7Reader￿ s action is an 2 f0;1g, and her state-dependent and action-
dependent loss function (negative utility) gives her one if she does not guess
her state correctly and gives her zero otherwise. Net utility is equal to neg-
ative expected loss minus the payment.
The assumption that lies at the hart of this model is that readers are busy
and will not read possibly long messages provided by the newspapers. As-
sume that even if the messages consist of long strings of binary digits, readers
will only read the ￿rst digit. The problem is that the message space is too
coarse relative to the dimensionality of state space and if the newspaper is
read by multiple and heterogeneous readers, in general it will not be per-
fectly tailored to any one reader. Intuitively, the world as understood by the
newspaper is too complicated to be pictured accurately in simple headlines,
so the newspaper faces a nontrivial decision problem of how to communicate
what it knows.
There are two elements of newspaper￿ s strategy: the choice of informa-
tional policy o⁄ered to readers followed by the pricing decision. Because the
readers will read only the ￿rst binary digit of the newspaper￿ s communication,
the informational policy boils down to a partition problem ￿newspaper is
assumed to partition the state space into two elements, x ￿ S and y = Srx,
and report in which element of the partition the true state is located, in x
or in y. The report is assumed to be sincere, and the true dilemma for the
newspaper is how to partition S. Hence, the focus of this note is to investi-
gate the optimal action of the newspaper, x 2 X; where X is the set of all
subsets of S.
The production and distribution technology is simple. At the time of
writing the message, the monopolistic newspaper (sender, mass medium, TV
station, website) will know the true state s 2 S . This information is delivered
to readers at a cost c ￿ 0 per reader, interpreted as printing and distribution
cost. There are no other costs.
Timing in the model is as follows.
81. The newspaper publicly commits to a partition, x 2 X:
2. The newspaper announces a take-it-or-leave-it price of the report p 2
RN
+ (This assumes perfect price discrimination. Later, some results
involving uniform pricing will be easy to develop)
3. After readers observed the partition and the price, they decide whether
to purchase the report or not.
4. The uncertainty is resolved and payo⁄s are realized. In particular, the
newspaper learns s and sincerely writes in the report that either s 2 x
or s 2 y; agents who purchase the report, learn its content; and ￿nally,
each reader n takes action an, and payo⁄s are realized.
This matches the timing of subscription. Agents subscribe to a newspaper
knowing that the events to be reported did not even happen yet. They do
so because the newspaper has certain informational policy and it is expected
to follow this policy in the future.
2.1 Example
Figure (1) shows two of many possible partitions in the case of three dimen-
sions, N = 3.3 Panel (a) shows symmetric unfocused partition
x = f(0;0;0);(0;0;1);(0;1;0);(1;0;0)g
Later, this partition will be called diagonal w.r.t. (0;0;0) or the main
diagonal and newspaper will be said to target all three readers. Panel (b)
shows a partition
x = f(0;0;0);(0;1;0);(0;0;1);(0;1;1)g
3If N = 1 then the message space is large enough to reveal the true state of nature
exactly. The case of even number of dimensions (such as N = 2) will be mentioned later.
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s1
s3
(0,0,0)
(1,1,1)
(1,0,0)
(0,1,1)
(a)
s2
s1
s3
(0,0,0)
(1,1,1)
(1,0,0)
(0,1,1)
(b)
Figure 1: Case N = 3: Black dots represent set x. Panel (a) ￿unfocused
strategy. Panel (b) ￿strategy focused on agent n = 1.
focused on reader n = 1. That is, newspaper tells only reader 1 his state,
s 2 x , s1 = 0. Nobody else learns anything about their states beyond
what is embedded in the correlation with the state of agent 1.
To continue this three-dimensional example, suppose that the distribution
is uniform, q (s) = 1
8 and that cost is zero, c = 0. One can easily ￿nd the
expected loss and the value of the newspaper to each of three agents, and
ultimately the gross value of this price-discriminating newspaper, for both
cases shown on Figure (1).
Panel (a)
reader n = 1;2;3
Loss cond. on x 0:25
Loss cond. on y 0:25
Uncond. loss, L 0:25
vn = 1
2 ￿ L 0:25
Total gross value V = 0:75
Panel (b)
reader n = 1 n = 2;3
Loss cond. on x 0 0:5
Loss cond. on y 0 0:5
Uncond. loss, L 0 0:5
vn = 1
2 ￿ L 0:5 0
Total gross value V = 0:5
10Note that the partition (a) is better for the newspaper than partition (b)
as it creates higher total gorss value to the readers which can be extracted
through take-it-or-leave-it prices.
2.2 The decision problem of a reader
To ￿nd an equilibrium in the general model, one proceeds backwards, starting
with the problem of a reader purchasing the newspaper and taking an action
in the last stage.
For each partition x, de￿ne Qx
n (y;0) to be the probability that s 2 y and
in the same time sn = 0.
Q
x
n (y;0) =
X
fm:sm2y;sm
n =0g
q (s
m)
De￿ne Qx
n (y;1), Qx
n (x;0) and Qx
n (x;1) in the same way. For each choice of
partition x, let ￿ Qx
n (y) = Qx
n (y;0) + Qx
n (y;1) be the probability of set y.
Suppose that reader n buys a newspaper and learns that the state is x:
Then the posterior probability that sn = 0 is
Qx
n(x;0)
￿ Qx
n(x) . The expected loss
conditional on x is
Qx
n (x;0)
￿ Qx
n (x)
an +
Qx
n (x;1)
￿ Qx
n (x)
(1 ￿ an)
This is a linear objective function. If the ￿rst fraction is smaller that the
second one, then the optimal choice is an = 1. Otherwise it is an = 0. In any
case, the minimal expected loss conditional on x is just
min
￿
Qx
n (x;0)
￿ Qx
n (x)
;
Qx
n (x;1)
￿ Qx
n (x)
￿
Similarly, one can de￿ne the optimal expected loss conditional on y.
Since the probability of x is ￿ Qx
n (x); the unconditional optimal loss (before
11learning the content of a newspaper) is
Ln = ￿ Q
x
n (x)min
￿
Qx
n (x;0)
￿ Qx
n (x)
;
Qx
n (x;1)
￿ Qx
n (x)
￿
+ ￿ Q
x
n (y)min
￿
Qx
n (y;0)
￿ Qx
n (y)
;
Qx
n (y;1)
￿ Qx
n (y)
￿
or
Ln = minfQ
x
n (x;0);Q
x
n (x;1)g + minfQ
x
n (y;0);Q
x
n (y;1)g
Assumption 1 implies 1
2 = Qx
n (x;0) + Qx
n (y;0) and 1
2 = Qx
n (x;1) +
Qx
n (y;1). Using these two equations to eliminate Qx
n (y;0) and Qx
n (y;1) from
Ln, one obtains eventually
Ln = minfQ
x
n (x;0);Q
x
n (x;1)g +
1
2
￿ maxfQ
x
n (x;0);Q
x
n (x;1)g
=
1
2
￿ jQ
x
n (x;0) ￿ Q
x
n (x;1)j
If the reader refrains from buying the newspaper, his expected loss is 1
2.
Hence the gross value that reader n attaches to the newspaper characterized
by x is
vn = jQ
x
n (x;0) ￿ Q
x
n (x;1)j =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
X
m:sm2x
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )q (s
m)
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
(1)
2.3 Price-discriminating monopolistic mass medium.
If a newspaper can price-discriminate, then the price decision for a given
partition is simple. Just charge the exact gross value (1) generated by this
newspaper. Corresponding revenue is equal to the total gross value V (x) =
PN
n=1 vn.
Diagonal partition with respect to s 2 S contains all the points that di⁄er
from s in less than half of the dimensions.
De￿nition 1 Partition x is diagonal with respect to s 2 S on set N0 ￿ N
12if
X
n2N0
jsn ￿ s
0
nj <
N0
2
) s
0 2 x and
X
n2N0
jsn ￿ s
0
nj >
N0
2
) s
0 2 y
Partition is diagonal on set N0 if there exists s such that it is diagonal w.r.t.
s on set N0. Partition is main diagonal on set N0 if it is diagonal with
respect to 0N0: If a partition is main diagonal on set of readers N0 then the
newspaper targets set N0:
As an example, consider panel (a) of Figure (1), which depicts the main
diagonal partition on N. In this case, half of the dimensions is 3
2; so partition
cell x should contain all points that di⁄er from the reference point (0;0;0)
in at most 1 position. Indeed, x contains point (0;0;0); which does not
di⁄er from the reference point, and all three points that di⁄er from it in
one position, namely points (0;0;1); (0;1;0) and (1;0;0): This newspaper
targets all three readers.
If N0 is even then for a given reference point there may be many diagonal
partitions. In this case, the de￿nition of a diagonal partition with respect
to s does not specify in what cell of the partition the points s0 such that
P
n2N0 jsn ￿ s0
nj =
N0
2 should be located in. It may be in x or in y. If N0 is
odd, then there are no such points, and so there is only one diagonal partition
for each reference point.
In total there are 2N0 points of reference for diagonal partitions. Note,
however, that a family of diagonal partitions with respect to s is essentially
the same as a family of diagonal partitions with respect to 1N0 ￿ s, only
with x and y exchanging their places ￿and gives the same surpluses to all
agents. Taking this into account, there is 2N0￿1 nontrivial reference points
for diagonal partitions.
The main result of this section follows. All proofs are in the Appendix.
13Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Let q (s) > 0 for all s 2 S.
If the newspaper sells to a nonempty subset N0 of readers, then
1. Every optimal partition is diagonal on set N0;
2. If N0 is even, then there is a reference point s￿ so that optimal x is
diagonal w.r.t. s￿ and all diagonal partitions w.r.t. s￿ are optimal.
This Proposition deals with the case of sunk costs of cN0, so optimality
here means maximization of the revenue, or total gross surplus from N0
readers. The ￿rst part states the necessary condition for optimality of a
partition ￿that the partition must be diagonal. The second part clari￿es
the case of even number of readers; the states that are "on the border" of
an optimal x can be included in any cell of the partition and that will not
change the gross value and hence the pro￿t.
This goes far in determining the optimal strategy of a newspaper, but still,
there is 2N0￿1 candidates for optimal partition (if N0 is odd), each associated
with a di⁄erent reference point. Which diagonal partition is optimal will
depend on distribution q (￿): Next section adds extra assumption that will
provide uniqueness.
2.4 Symmetric players and useful parametrization
It will be convenient to further restrict the family of distributions and con-
sider the following distribution parametrized by a single coe¢ cient ￿ 2 [0;1],
Assumption 2 The distribution is
q (s) =
(
q0 = ￿1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿) 1
2N if s = 0N or s = 1N
q1 = (1 ￿ ￿) 1
2N otherwise
Parameter ￿ is the correlation coe¢ cient for any two dimensions. If ￿ = 0
then the distribution is uniform and readers￿states are independent; if ￿ = 1
14then the probability is uniform on the two extreme states, 0N and 1N; and
readers￿states are perfectly correlated.
It is easy to ￿nd the marginal distribution on the subset of all read-
ers and this will be useful later. Let N0 ￿ N denote this set of read-
ers. De￿ne the marginal distribution on N0, denoted qN0 (s1;:::;sN0) =
P
sn:n= 2N0 q (s1;:::;sN): Obviously,
q
N0 (s) =
(
q
N0
0 = ￿1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿) 1
2N0 if s = 0N0 or s = 1N0;
q
N0
1 = (1 ￿ ￿) 1
2N0 otherwise
Under this more speci￿c assumption on distribution, the unique optimal
partition is the one which is diagonal with respect to 0N0; or in other words,
targets a set N0. Note that the partition is unique for a given set of readers
N0: But the readers are all identical so a di⁄erent set of readers having the
same number of elements would also lead to the same total value and therefore
the same pro￿t. This type of multiplicity is ignored here and hereafter.
Firstly, de￿ne a function
h(N) =
8
<
:
￿N￿1
N￿1
2
￿
if N is odd
￿N￿1
N
2 ￿1
￿
if N is even
The following result provides the explicit formulae for gross value created by
the optimizing newspaper.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Let 0 < ￿ < 1: If the
newspaper sells to a nonempty subset of readers N0, then a partition is opti-
mal if and only if the newspaper targets set N0. The average individual gross
value of reader n is
vn (N0) =
(
^ vn (N0) = ￿1
2 + (1 ￿ ￿) 1
2N0h(N0) if n is targeted
￿1
2 if n is not targeted
15N0 N
2
1
r c
( ) 0 ˆN v
odd
even
() ￿ v ˆ
Figure 2: Function ^ vn (￿) and the pro￿t of the newspaper.
Figure (2) shows the distribution of values created by a newspaper target-
ing a set of N0 readers. An important observation is that readers who are not
even targeted by a newspaper may still ￿nd it somewhat useful. The reason
is that their state is correlated with the state of a targeted reader. As the
readers become more statistically independent, ￿ ! 0, the value created by
the newspaper to readers who are not targeted vanishes. On the other hand,
as the readers are more and more statistically correlated, ￿ ! 1, the value
of readers who are not targeted converges to the value of targeted readers.
Some of the properties of these values can be easily computed.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 2 holds.
1. Suppose N0 is even, then adding one more reader leaves the individual
16average value of a targeted reader unchanged
^ vn (N0) = ^ vn (N0 + 1)
2. Suppose N0 is odd, then adding one more reader increases the total
value of all targeted readers by ￿1
2
^ vn (N0)N0 + ￿
1
2
= ^ vn (N0 + 1)(N0 + 1)
3. Suppose N0 is odd, then adding one more reader leaves the total value
of all readers unchanged
^ vn (N0)N0 + ￿
1
2
(N ￿ N0) = ^ vn (N0 + 1)(N0 + 1) + ￿
1
2
(N ￿ (N0 + 1))
This lemma shows that the case of two readers is not that interesting
because newspaper￿ s revenue is exactly the same as with one reader, if ￿ = 0.
The simplest nontrivial case involves three readers, as in the above illustrative
example. One can also note that the individual gross value ^ vn (N0) to a
targeted reader is decreasing in odd N0 down to 1
2￿, but that the total gross
value ^ vn (N0)N0 to odd N0 is increasing.
The analysis so far focused on optimal partition for a given readership
N0: The last step is to investigate how big the readership should be. The
newspaper seeks to ￿nd the best readership N0 to maximize pro￿t. It turns
out that the behavior of this pro￿t as a function of N0 depends on the
relationship between the correlation coe¢ cient and average cost. If c <
￿
2 then the pro￿t is increasing; if
￿
2 < c then the pro￿t is decreasing for all
N0 large enough, but may be increasing for small N0. The following N￿ (c)
will be the candidate for optimal readership in this case
N
￿ (c) = arg max
N02f0;1;3;5;:::g
(^ vn (N0) ￿ c)N0
17(Also de￿ne No to be N if N is odd and N ￿ 1 if N is even). The following
proposition clari￿es all cases.
Proposition 3 Suppose assumption 2 holds.
1. If c <
￿
2, then pro￿t
(^ vn (N0) ￿ c)N0 +
￿￿
2
￿ c
￿
(N ￿ N0)
is strictly increasing. The action is optimal if and only if the newspaper
targets all N (even or odd) readers.
2. If
￿
2 < c; then N￿ (c) exists and is generically unique. Pro￿t (^ vn (N0) ￿ c)N0
as a function of odd N0 is strictly increasing for N0 < N￿ (c) and
strictly decreasing for N0 > N￿ (c): The action is optimal if and only
if the newspaper targets odd minfNo;N￿ (c)g readers.
3. If c =
￿
2, then pro￿t (^ vn (N0) ￿ c)N0 is strictly increasing between even
N0 and odd N0 +1; but is constant between odd N0 and even N0 +1: If
N is odd, then the action is optimal if and only if the newspaper targets
N readers. If N is even, then targeting N readers and N ￿ 1 readers
is optimal.
3 Duopoly
In the ￿rst stage, newspapers publicly and simultaneously commit to their
partitions. In the second stage, after observing the realization of the pro￿le
of partitions, (x1;x2), each announces a discriminatory price of the report,
pjn. This section obeys Assumption 2 throughout and focuses on a case of
N
2 being an odd integer. Follow the convention that if c ￿
￿
2 (so that N￿ (c)
does not exist), then N￿ (c) = 1:
The demand side works similarly as before. In particular, each reader
can read only one message that can take two values, so that a reader will
18choose one newspaper or none at all, but will never buy two. Let vjn =
￿ ￿Q
xj
n (xj;0) ￿ Q
xj
n (xj;1)
￿ ￿ be the value that newspaper xj creates to reader n:
Lemma 2 For any value pro￿le and price pro￿le, the following reader￿ s be-
havior maximizes her payo⁄
1. If vjn ￿ pjn < 0 then n will not buy j.
2. Otherwise, n buys j if vjn ￿ pjn > vin ￿ pin.
3. If that is equal, then n buys j if vjn > vin.
4. If that is equal too, then choose newspaper randomly.
From now on, the reader is assumed to behave according to this lemma.
This formally de￿nes a two-stage extensive form game with two newspapers
as players. The next section analyses the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
of this game.
3.1 Equilibria
The equilibrium behavior in the second stage is described by the following
lemma
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium, for any gross value pro￿le fv1n;v2ngn=1;:::;N
newspaper i = 1;2 announces prices
pin = c + maxfvin ￿ maxfvjn;cg;0g
for all readers n = 1;:::;N, and j 6= i:
Intuitively, a form of Bertrand competition for each separate reader en-
sues. In any equilibrium, the surplus of a seller generating the lower value
must be "competed away". As an illustration assume that c = 0 and reader
19n has values such that v1n > v2n. Then newspaper 1 would announce price
p1n = v1n￿v2n and newspaper 2 price p2n = 0. The net surplus of this reader
is equal to v2n across newspapers; so by point (3) of Lemma 2, the reader
buys newspaper 1. One might say that the price (or per reader pro￿t) of
newspaper 1 is equal to the "gross value" of the newspaper to this reader,
v1n, like in the monopoly case, minus the "price concession" that must be
granted in order to convince him to choose this newspaper, v2n. If v1n = v2n
then prices of both newspapers are equal to the cost of delivery zero.
The next lemma describes behavior in the ￿rst stage. It observes that
the partition that is the best response has a familiar form from the previous
section,
Lemma 4 Suppose that newspaper i best responds to a fvjngn=1;:::;N by choos-
ing a partition, such that there exist readers with values vin ￿ maxfvjn;cg.
Denote this set of readers by Ni. Then newspaper i targets Ni:
The intuition behind this key result is simple. Since pro￿t can be viewed
as the di⁄erence between gross value and the price concession ￿the former
depending on own partition and the latter on the partition of the opponent ￿
maximizing pro￿t must involve maximization of the gross value. The choice
of the partition of the opponent is irrelevant.
So far the conclusion is that in any equilibrium there can be readers tar-
geted by newspaper i only, by j only, by neither or by both. Let f
￿
Ne
j
￿
=
N￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿￿
. The following proposition asserts that no reader can be tar-
geted by both newspapers and furthermore clari￿es the magnitudes of equi-
librium readerships of the newspapers. It is the main result of this section.
Proposition 4 Equilibrium in the ￿rst stage.
1. Let N ￿ 2N￿ (c): Partition pro￿le (x1;x2) is an equilibrium in the ￿rst
stage if and only if newspaper i = 1;2 targets set N e
i readers such that
(a) N e
1 [ N e
2 = N
20(b) N e
1 \ N e
2 = ?
(c) f
￿
Ne
j
￿
￿ Ne
i ￿ N￿ (c); where i 6= j:
2. Let 2N￿ (c) < N: Partition pro￿le (x1;x2) is an equilibrium in the ￿rst
stage if and only if newspaper i = 1;2 targets set N e
i readers such that
(a) N e
1 \ N e
2 = ?
(b) Ne
i = N￿ (c).
Condition f
￿
Ne
j
￿
￿ Ne
i deserves some explanation. Consider a pro￿le
of readerships that partitions the total set of readers and in which Ni is
small and Nj is large. Newspaper j creates a low value for the readers
it targets. Newspaper i may want to deviate by targeting some of these
readers in addition to its own readers. After such a deviation, a reader
who is targeted by both newspapers is in a really good situation, because
the newspapers engage in a more aggressive price war in this market. Such
reader will ultimately buy rather newspaper i; whose price is equal to
pin = c + ^ vin (Ni) ￿ ^ vjn
￿
N
e
j
￿
This means however, that the price-cost margin of newspaper i from this
reader is equal to ^ vin (Ni)￿^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿
: The pro￿t of a newspaper deviating in
such a way behaves exactly like a pro￿t of a monopolist with unit ￿ cost￿equal
to ^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿
: The number N￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿￿
exists and the further away Ni is
from it, the lower the pro￿t after such a deviation. So, if initial readership Ne
i
is already greater or equal to N￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿￿
, then targeting even more new
readers that are already targeted by j will lead to lower pro￿t, and therefore
cannot constitute a pro￿table deviation. On the other hand, if readership
Ne
i is lower than N￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿￿
, then targeting new readers will increase the
pro￿t and hence (Ne
1;Ne
2) is inconsistent with equilibrium.
It is straightforward to conclude that function f is an increasing step
function with odd values. As it turns out, however, f can be approximated
21by a linear function fa, if the argument Ne
j is large. In particular, note that
f
￿
Ne
j
￿
￿ Ne
i is equivalent to the condition that marginal gross value from
increasing the readership of newspaper i from odd Ne
i to Ne
i + 2 does not
exceed the marginal ￿ cost￿of increasing this readership, equal to ^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿
;
or in other words
(Ne
i + 2) ^ vin (Ne
i + 2) ￿ Ne
i ^ vin (Ne
i )
2
￿ ^ vjn
￿
N
e
j
￿
Plugging in the formulae for values, one obtains
1
2
1
2Ne
i +1
(Ne
i + 1)!
￿
Ne
i +1
2 !
￿2 ￿
1
2
Ne
j ￿1
￿
Ne
j ￿ 1
￿
!
￿
Ne
j ￿1
2 !
￿2 (2)
Factorial can be approximated using Sterling￿ s formula4 leading to
N
e
i ￿ fa
￿
N
e
j
￿
=
1
4
N
e
j ￿
5
4
Note that expression (2) implies the following result:
Corollary 1 Function f is independent of parameters ￿ and c.
There is a convenient way to illustrate the equilibria graphically in the
space where readerships are measured on two axes, as in Figure 3. A point
in this space depicts readerships of newspapers j and i: Given the total
number of potential readers N and provided that N ￿ 2N￿ (c) newspapers
can achieve readerships Ne
j and Ne
i only if Ne
j + Ne
i = N. In other words,
equilibrium readerships can lie only on a a line with slope ￿1; such as line
AB on Figure 3. The further the line lies from the origin, the higher N it
represents.
In addition to that, readerships cannot be too asymmetric. Newspaper
i does not have any incentives to increase her readership Ne
i as long as it
4 N!
(
N
2 !)
2 ￿
q
2
￿
1 p
N2N for large N:
22is above f
￿
Ne
j
￿
; that is, above point A on that line. Otherwise newspaper
i would like to target some of the readership of newspaper j: On the other
hand, newspaper i does not want to decrease her readership if it stays below
N￿ (c); that is, it is below point B: Since the situation is symmetric across
players, newspaper j is subjected to the same incentives. All pairs of odd
readerships on a line between points A and C are equilibrium readerships.
If the economy has a little more potential readers, as represented by a line
DE; then the same incentives are at work, but the condition Ne
i ￿ N￿ (c)
begins to operate before the condition f
￿
Ne
j
￿
￿ Ne
i . As the result all pro￿les
of odd readerships on the line between E and D represent equilibria.
If the economy has more than 2N￿ (c) readers, then in all equilibria the
readership is precisely N￿ (c); graphically represented by point F:
3.2 Some comparative statics
The e⁄ect of change of cost c is fairly straightforward. The lower c, the
cheaper the delivery of a newspaper is. In case of N ￿ 2N￿ (c), as c falls,
N￿ (c) goes up and the set of equilibrium readership pro￿les expands. If c goes
below 1
2￿ then N￿ (c) becomes in￿nity. On the other hand, if 2N￿ (c) < N
then the unique equilibrium readership pro￿le increases in line with N￿ (c):
On the other hand, Corollary 1 makes it clear that condition f
￿
Ne
j
￿
￿ Ne
i
is not a⁄ected by c:
The change of ￿ is more interesting. One e⁄ect is on N￿ (c) ￿the higher
￿, the higher N￿ (c):
Secondly, there may be an e⁄ect on function f. Since ￿ describes the
￿ closeness￿between any two readers or markets, one may expect that its
change a⁄ects the competition between the newspapers. The larger this
correlation coe¢ cient is, the easier it should be for one newspaper to capture
the readers targeted by the other newspaper. However, Corollary 1 proclaims
that function f is independent of ￿. Indeed increasing ￿ a⁄ects positively the
incentives of newspaper i to capture the readers targeted by the opponent
23A
Nj
Ni Ni= Nj= ½ N
f(Nj)
Ni + Nj = N
N*(c)
N*(c)
B
C
D
E
F
Figure 3: Duopoly. Readership pro￿les in equilibrium.
24j in the sense that individual gross value form captured readers increases.
However, the individual gross value created by newspaper j also increases,
so that the price concession that newspaper i must grant after the deviation
increases too. The net e⁄ect of these two opposing forces is zero.
This observation means that there is a discontinuity around point ￿ = 1:
With perfect correlation, a newspaper is as good to a targeted reader as to
the one that is not targeted. Consequently, prices are equal and readers may
randomize between newspapers with various probabilities. Any readership
pro￿le satisfying Ne
1 +Ne
2 = N can be supported by an equilibrium, if c < 1
2:
But as soon as ￿ falls to below one, condition f
￿
Ne
j
￿
￿ Ne
i begins to have a
bite, knocking out all readership pro￿les that are too asymmetric.
On the other hand, the competition does become ￿ercer as the correlation
between readers increases, in the sense that for any equilibrium readership
pro￿le prices go down to c as ￿ increases to 1.
4 Discussion and extensions
This section discusses a few easy extensions that revolve around classical
issues in the industrial organization literature such as uniform prices, entry,
collusion and e¢ ciency. All these exercises can be performed with relatively
few modi￿cations, and proofs are skipped. More challenging modeling choices
are discussed in the last part of this section.
4.1 Uniform prices
The analysis above assumes that newspapers can tailor prices to particular
readers or markets. This is justi￿ed if arbitrage is not possible, for instance
if newspapers are sold in di⁄erent countries, or if a mass medium is not a
newspaper but for instance a coded TV channel. In many cases however,
one would expect that all readers can purchase a newspaper for the cheapest
price around.
25Assume that the model is the same as above except that prices must be
the same for all readers. The result for the monopoly is immediate:
Proposition 5 Suppose that there is one monopolistic newspaper. Choice
of partition and price is optimal in the model with discriminatory prices if
and only if it is optimal in the model with uniform prices.
Since the optimal discriminatory price is uniform this result is straightfor-
ward. It strongly relies on the Assumption 2 of symmetry between readers.
However, the situation in the model of duopoly is slightly more compli-
cated.
Proposition 6 Suppose that there are two newspapers. If a strategy pro￿le
forms an equilibrium in the model with discriminatory prices then it forms
an equilibrium in the model with uniform prices.
If no newspaper has incentives to deviate if it can choose any discrimina-
tory price, then it cannot improve if it is restricted to use only uniform prices.
On the other hand, the converse is not true ￿one may have an equilibrium in
a model with uniform prices that is not an equilibrium in a version with dis-
criminatory pricing. The reason is that an attempt by a newspaper to invade
the readership of the other newspaper is much more di¢ cult with uniform
prices. A deviating newspaper has to o⁄er a discount. With uniform prices,
the discount has to be granted to all readers, even to high-value core readers.
This e⁄ect was absent in discriminatory pricing model. As the result, the
set of equilibrium readerships with uniform prices would contain the shaded
set of equilibrium readerships on Figure 3 although this set would still be a
proper subset of the square [0;N￿ (c)] ￿ [0;N￿ (c)]:
4.2 Collusive behavior and e¢ cient newspapers
Consider an optimal collusive action of two newspapers, which not only in-
volves collusive pricing, but also collusive choice of partitions. Alternatively,
one can think of a monopolist owning two newspapers.
26Proposition 7 Every optimal collusive strategy pro￿le is to divide all agents
into two groups of size N
2 and then create a newspaper targeting each group.
The price of the newspaper targeting a reader is the same as a monopolistic
full surplus extraction. The price of the newspaper not targeting a reader is
set at a level higher than the newspaper￿ s value to this reader.
It is not surprising that collusive choice of prices is to keep them as high as
possible, to extract the entire surplus created to the readers. It is interesting,
however, that collusive partition is also one of many equilibrium partitions
in duopoly ￿the symmetric one. In other words, if an optimal cartel of
newspapers is split by a regulator, then the average quality of newspapers
will not improve (and may deteriorate, on average, if the duopoly ends up in
asymmetric equilibrium), although the price may go down.
The behavior of the monopolistic newspaper in discriminatory or uniform
pricing cases is socially e¢ cient as it maximizes the value created by the
newspaper in the information transmission. Moreover, the corollary following
from the proposition is that among many equilibria in duopoly case, the
symmetric ones are e¢ cient as well.
4.3 Other modi￿cations and future work
This study has a capacity to serve as a starting point to a few extensions that
will address a number of natural and important questions. The ￿rst class of
questions relate to the analysis of a model with readers￿actions creating an
externality. This type of model would be able to assess the merits of media
regulation, for instance in the context of potentially important in￿ uence of
mass media on political or social actions. The second interesting issue relates
to media that are not only interested in revenue maximization from paying
readers, but also have an agenda or additional interest in a particular action
of readers. This type of model would be able to say something on commercial
advertising or political in￿ uence of media owners.
275 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1. Fix a partition x, not diagonal on set N0. Let D+ ￿ N0 be a set
of agents (dimensions) purchasing the newspaper for whom the probability
di⁄erence Qn (x;0) ￿ Qn (x;1) is nonnegative:
D
+ =
(
n :
X
m:sm2x
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )q (s
m) ￿ 0
)
Let D￿ ￿ N0 be the set of remaining purchasing agents. De￿ne s￿ 2 f0;1g
N0
to be the point such that
s
￿
n =
(
0 if n 2 D+
1 if n 2 D￿
As x is not diagonal on set N0, it is not diagonal with respect to s￿.
Therefore, either there exists s0 2 x such that
PN0
n=1 js￿
n ￿ s0
nj >
N0
2 , or there
exists s0 2 y such that
X
n2N0
js
￿
n ￿ s
0
nj <
N0
2
(3)
Without loss of generality, assume that the second case applies.
28The revenue form including s0 in the set x is
R(x [ s
0) =
X
n2D+
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
X
m:sm2x[s0
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )q (s
m)
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
+
X
n2D￿
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
￿
X
m:sm2x[s0
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )q (s
m)
￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
+
X
n= 2N0
0
￿
X
n2D+
 
X
m:sm2x[s0
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )q (s
m)
!
+
X
n2D￿
 
￿
X
m:sm2x[s0
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )q (s
m)
!
=
X
n2D+
X
m:sm2x
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )q (s
m) +
X
n2D￿
 
￿
X
m:sm2x
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )q (s
m)
!
+
+
X
n2D+
(1 ￿ 2s
0
n)q (s
0) ￿
X
n2D￿
(1 ￿ 2s
0
n)q (s
0)
or simply
R(x [ s
0) ￿ R(x) +
 
X
n2D+
(1 ￿ 2s
0
n) ￿
X
n2D￿
(1 ￿ 2s
0
n)
!
q (s
0) (4)
Furthermore, inequality (3) implies
N0
2
>
X
n2D+
s
0
n +
X
n2D￿
(1 ￿ s
0
n)
0 < ￿
X
n2D+
2s
0
n ￿
X
n2D￿
(2 ￿ 2s
0
n) + N0
0 < ￿
X
n2D+
2s
0
n ￿
X
n2D￿
(2 ￿ 2s
0
n) +
X
n2D+
1 +
X
n2D￿
1
0 <
X
n2D+
(1 ￿ 2s
0
n) ￿
X
n2D￿
(1 ￿ 2s
0
n)
Therefore, the brackets in (4) is strictly positive. Since q (￿) > 0 as well,
including s0 in x will strictly increase the revenue, R(x [ s0) > R(x). This
proves that a x that is non-diagonal on set N0 is not optimal.
29Part 2. Given any diagonal partition x with respect to s; de￿ne
￿ y =
(
s
0 2 y :
X
n2N0
jsn ￿ s
0
nj =
N0
2
)
Let x be an optimal partition, and hence diagonal with respect to some
reference point s: Denote this partition x(s) and let the revenue from this
partition be R(x(s)): De￿ne D+; D￿ and point s￿ like above.
Note that x(s) must be diagonal w.r.t. s￿ too (by the same argument
as in Part 1 above.) Hence we can call this partition x(s￿) and note that
trivially R(x(s￿)) = R(x(s)):
Finally note that any diagonal partition w.r.t s￿ is optimal. That is,
consider (w.l.o.g.) s0 2 ￿ y and consider partition x(s￿) [ s0 which is also
a diagonal partition w.r.t. s￿. Then by the same derivation as in Part 1
leading to equation 4 we have R(x(s￿) [ s0) ￿ R(x(s￿)): Since x(s￿) is
optimal, these revenues are equal.
5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that N0 is odd. Given N0; the cost of cN0 is sunk. Therefore,
newspaper￿ s optimal partition must maximize the total gross value from a
set N0.
The necessary condition for the total gross value from these readers to be
maximal is that a partition is diagonal with respect to N0. Consider a diag-
onal partition w.r.t. s￿ = (0;:::;0;1;:::;1), represented by A =
P
n2N0 s￿
n ￿ 1
a number of ones in s￿. Let B = N0 ￿ A be the number of zeros in s￿: Such
partition will be denoted by xA, its elements have N0 dimensions and the rele-
vant probability is the marginal qN0: There are two types of readers. Readers
n = 1;:::;B (so that s￿
n = 0) are type one and readers n = B + 1;:::;N0 (so
that s￿
n = 1) are type two.
The individual value from a partition represented by A is given by equa-
30tion 1, and can be written as
vn (A) =
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
q
N0
0 + q
N0
1
X
m:sm2xAr0N0
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n )
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
The value of
P
on the far right counts all states in xA r (0;:::;0) that have
zero at nth dimension and subtracts the number of states in xA r (0;:::;0)
that have one there. The strategy of the proof is to ￿nd these two numbers
for both type of readers, and then compute the values vn (A) for both type
of readers.
Consider type one reader ￿rst; without loss of generality let it be
reader n = B. Any point s 2 S di⁄ers from s￿ in a number of dimensions.
Let l0
B be the number of dimensions where point s has one, and s￿ has zero
except for reader n = B, l0
B =
PB￿1
n=1 sn. Let lA be the number of dimensions
where point s has zero, and s￿ has one, lA =
PN0
n=B+1 (1 ￿ sn).
Case one: sn = 0: The total number of di⁄erences between s and s￿ is
the total number of di⁄erences on dimensions 1;:::;B ￿ 1 (l0
B of them), on
dimension n = B (no di⁄erences here) and on dimensions B+1;:::;Nm (lA of
them); the total number of di⁄erences is therefore l0
B + lA =
PN0
n=1 jsn ￿ s￿
nj.
If this point s is to be in xA then it must be that l0
B + lA ￿
N0￿1
2 :
There is exactly
￿B￿1
l0
B
￿￿A
lA
￿
points that are represented by a given pair
(l0
B;lA): Therefore, the total number of points that are in set xA and have
sn = 0 is
X
lA=0;:::;A
X
l0
B=0;:::;
N0￿1
2 ￿lA
￿
B ￿ 1
l0
B
￿￿
A
lA
￿
The total number of points that are in set xA r 0N0 and have sn = 0 is
X
lA=0;:::;A
X
l0
B=0;:::;
N0￿1
2 ￿lA
￿
B ￿ 1
l0
B
￿￿
A
lA
￿
￿ 1
Case two: sn = 1: Everything is the same except that there is one more
31di⁄erence between s and s￿; namely at dimension n = B: Such a point s will
be in xA if l0
B +lA+1 ￿
N0￿1
2 : Therefore, the total number of points that are
in xA (and in xA r 0N0) and have sn = 1 is
X
lA=0;:::;A
X
l0
B=0;:::;
N0￿1
2 ￿lA￿1
￿
B ￿ 1
l0
B
￿￿
A
lA
￿
Hence, the di⁄erence between these two cases is
X
m:sm2xAr0N0
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n ) =
X
lA=0;:::;A
￿
B ￿ 1
N0￿1
2 ￿ lA
￿￿
A
lA
￿
￿ 1
=
￿
N0 ￿ 1
N0￿1
2
￿
￿ 1
and the gross value of this type of reader is
vn (A) =
￿
q
N0
0 ￿ q
N0
1
￿
+ q
N0
1
￿
N0 ￿ 1
N0￿1
2
￿
(5)
= ￿
1
2
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
1
2N0
￿
N0 ￿ 1
N0￿1
2
￿
Now consider a reader of type two, without loss of generality let this
be reader n = N0. Any point s is characterized by: lB, which is the number
of di⁄erences between s and s￿ on dimensions 1;:::;B; by l0
A; which is the
number of di⁄erences on dimensions B + 1;:::;N0 ￿ 1 : and by the value of
the last dimension sn:
Case one: sn = 0; then the number of di⁄erences between s and s￿ is
lB + l0
A + 1: This number must be no more than
N0￿1
2 if a point s is to be
in xA; or l0
A ￿
N0￿1
2 ￿ lB ￿ 1: There is exactly
￿B￿1
lB
￿￿A￿1
l0
A
￿
points that are
represented by a given pair (lB;l0
A): Therefore, the total number of points
32that are in xA r 0N0 and have sn = 0 is
X
lB=0;:::;B
X
l0
A=0;:::;
N0￿1
2 ￿lB￿1
￿
B
lB
￿￿
A ￿ 1
l0
A
￿
￿ 1
Case two: sn = 1; the number of di⁄erences between s and s￿ is lB +l0
A:
Therefore, the total number of points that are in xA r 0N0 and have sn = 1
is X
lB=0;:::;B
X
l0
A=0;:::;
N0￿1
2 ￿lB
￿
B
lB
￿￿
A ￿ 1
l0
A
￿
Subtracting these two numbers from each other give
X
m:sm2xAr0N0
(1 ￿ 2s
m
n ) = ￿
X
lB=0;:::;B
￿
B
lB
￿￿
A ￿ 1
N0￿1
2 ￿ lB
￿
￿ 1
= ￿
￿
N0 ￿ 1
N0￿1
2
￿
￿ 1
The resulting value of this type of reader is
vn (A) =
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
q
N0
0 ￿ q
N0
1
￿
￿ q
N0
1
￿
N0 ￿ 1
N0￿1
2
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
=
￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿
1
2
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1
2N0
￿
N0 ￿ 1
N0￿1
2
￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿
It can be concluded immediately that this value is strictly less than of
type one reader in equation 5. In other words, the total gross value would
be maximized if the number of type two readers was zero, A = 0:
Now consider case that N0 is even. By the second part of Proposition 1
there is diagonal partition w.r.t. point s￿ so that point s belongs to x if it
di⁄ers from s￿ in at most
N0
2 ￿ 1 dimensions. The rest of the proof follows
exactly the same steps, but with
N0￿1
2 replaced by
N0
2 ￿ 1:
335.3 Proof of Lemma 2
By direct comparison of available options: buy newspaper 1, buy newspaper
2, not buy.
5.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Let
￿ pin = c + maxfvin ￿ maxfvjn;cg;0g
First step is to con￿rm that pjn = ￿ pjn for j = 1;2 and all readers n
is an equilibrium. Suppose that player j is using this pricing. Changing
newspaper￿ s i price to a reader has only consequences for pro￿t from this
reader only, while the pro￿t from other readers remains unchanged.
Consider a reader n for which vin > maxfvjn;cg: By sticking to ￿ pin,
newspaper i gets a net pro￿t of vin ￿ maxfvjn;cg > 0. By deviating to a
higher price for this reader, this newspaper looses this reader to newspaper
j: By deviating to a lower price for this reader, this newspaper gets a lower
revenue.
Now consider a case vin ￿ maxfvjn;cg: Then by sticking to ￿ pin = c;
newspaper i gets payo⁄of zero. By deviating to a higher price, this newspaper
will not get to sell to the reader, so the pro￿t stays at zero. Deviating to a
lower price is obviously not pro￿table.
The second step is to show that there are no other equilibria. The logic
follows the same lines as above and the proof is omitted.
5.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Suppose that newspaper i best responds to a fvj1;:::;vjNg by choosing a
partition generating fvi1;:::;viNg so that
vin ￿ maxfvjn;cg ￿ 0 if and only if n 2 Ni
34and suppose that it does not target set Ni:
The revenue of newspaper i is equal to
X
n2Ni
(vin ￿ maxfvjn;cg) (6)
Note that the deviation to a partition that targets Ni strictly increases the
total gross value of readers in Ni; that is
P
n2Ni ^ vin (Ni) >
P
n2Ni vin. As a
consequence, the revenue from the original partition in (6) is strictly lower
than the left-hand side of
X
n2Ni
(^ vin (Ni) ￿ maxfvjn;cg) ￿
X
n2Ni
maxf^ vin (Ni) ￿ maxfvjn;cg;0g
The right-hand side of the above equation is a revenue from targeting Ni
readers (in case of Ni being even, this is the revenue coming from a symmetric
partition targeting Ni, so that ^ vin (Ni) is not only the average value of each
targeted reader, but the actual value, equal across readers)
This proves that the original partition was not optimal.
5.6 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is conducted in a series of steps.
Step 1. In any equilibrium Ne
i ￿ N￿ (c).
Proof. Suppose that N￿ (c) < Ne
i : Then, by lowering the set of targeted
readers to N￿ (c); newspaper i will strictly increase the total gross value
created to its readers, hence the revenue and hence the pro￿t.
Step 2. In any equilibrium no reader is targeted by both newspapers.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium in which newspapers target sets Ni and Nj
such that Ni ￿ N￿ (c) and Nj ￿ N￿ (c) respectively and contrary to the
lemma suppose that the set Ni \ Nj contains at least one reader. Without
loss of generality assume that c < ^ vin (Ni) ￿ ^ vjn (Nj); or Nj ￿ Ni. The
implication of this is that the revenue of newspaper i from all readers in set
35Ni\Nj is zero, because it sells only to N￿Nj readers who are not targeted by
j (if ^ vin (Ni) < ^ vjn (Nj)) or the price is equal to cost (if ^ vin (Ni) = ^ vjn (Nj)).
Note that there are no readers who are not targeted at all. If there were
such readers n0; then newspaper i could cease targeting reader n and start
targeting n0. The only result of this change would be that newspaper i obtains
an additional revenue of ^ vin (Ni) ￿ 1
2￿; which is strictly positive. From now
on, assume that there are no readers who are not targeted at all.
Case 1. Consider equilibria in which set Ni \ Nj contains two readers or
more. Newspaper i can cease targeting two readers belonging to Ni \ Nj,
strictly increase the value of ^ vin (￿) and hence the price to all readers that it
sells to in set N r Nj:
Case 2. Consider equilibria in which set Ni \ Nj contains precisely one
reader.
Suppose that Ni is even. Then newspaper i can cease targeting this one
reader belonging to Ni \ Nj, strictly increase the value of ^ vin (￿) and hence
the price to all readers that it sells to in set N r Nj:
If Ni is odd then Nj < Ni must be even (This is because N
2 is an integer
by assumption, so N + 1 = Ni + Nj is an odd number). Newspaper j can
increase the readership by one reader already targeted by newspaper i; so
that it targets odd readers Nj+1. This will not a⁄ect the value of ^ vjn (￿) and
will bring the additional revenue from this reader of ^ vjn (Nj) ￿ ^ vin (Ni) > 0:
These results imply that in any equilibrium there are two sets of readers
￿set N e
1 is targeted by newspaper 1, while N e
2 is targeted by newspaper 2,
such that Ne
1 + Ne
2 ￿ N.
Step 3. If Ne
1 + Ne
2 < N then Ne
i = N￿ (c):
Proof. Direct implication of Proposition 3
Step 4. Consider any equilibrium readership pro￿le (Ne
1;Ne
2) and sup-
pose that Ne
1 + Ne
2 = N: Then Ne
i is odd.
Proof. Suppose not: let there be an equilibrium in which Ne
i is even. Since
36N
2 is assumed to be an integer, N = Ne
i + Ne
j is even, so is Ne
j. One of the
newspapers must have strictly higher readership; without loss of generality
assume ^ vin (Ne
i ) > ^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿
: Then newspaper i would have incentives to
target an additional reader already targeted by j: The value of function ^ vin (￿)
does not change, so the additional pro￿t is ^ vin (Ne
i ) ￿ ^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿
> 0:
Step 5. Consider any readership pro￿le (Ne
1;Ne
2) and suppose that Ne
1 +
Ne
2 = N: If Ne
i ￿ N￿ (c) then newspaper i has no incentives to lower its
readership to any alternative Ni < Ne
i .
Proof. Direct implication of Proposition 3
Step 6. Consider any readership pro￿le (Ne
1;Ne
2) and suppose that Ne
1 +
Ne
2 = N: If
N
￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
N
e
j
￿￿
￿ N
e
i (7)
then newspaper i has no incentives to increase its readership to any alterna-
tive Ni > Ne
i . If Ne
i < N￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿￿
then newspaper i has strictly positive
incentives to increase the readership from Ne
i , and hence this Ne
i cannot be
a part of an equilibrium.
Proof. Consider any readership pro￿le (Ne
1;Ne
2) such that Ne
1 + Ne
2 = N:
Newspaper i may want to change the behavior by targeting some extra read-
ers from the opponent￿ s set N e
j in addition to those already targeted in
set N e
i . Let Ni ￿ N e
i be the set of readers targeted by deviating news-
paper i: This deviation has chances of generating additional pro￿t only if
^ vin (Ni) > ^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿
:
After a deviation, reader n 2 Ni \ N e
j targeted by both newspapers will
buy rather from newspaper i; whose price, by lemma 3, is equal to
pin = c + ^ vin (Ni) ￿ ^ vjn
￿
N
e
j
￿
This means however, that the price-cost margin of newspaper i from this
reader is equal to ^ vin (Ni)￿^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿
: The pro￿t of a newspaper deviating in
such a way behaves exactly like a pro￿t of a monopolist with unit ￿ cost￿equal
37to ^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿
: By Proposition 3, a ￿nite and odd number N￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿￿
exists
and the further away Ni is from it, the lower the pro￿t after the deviation.
So, if initial readership Ne
i is already greater or equal than N￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿￿
,
then targeting even more new readers that are already targeted by j will lead
to lower pro￿t, and therefore cannot constitute a pro￿table deviation.
On the other hand, if readership Ne
i is lower than N￿ ￿
^ vjn
￿
Ne
j
￿￿
, then tar-
geting new readers will increase the pro￿t and hence (Ne
1;Ne
2) is inconsistent
with equilibrium.
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